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"Son of Sam" and His Legislative Off spring: 
The Constitutionality of Stripping Criminals 
of Their Literary Profits 
Alan Young* 
We have seen in recent years a growing demand to recognize the victims' 
rights and needs. In Canadian jurisdictions this has resulted in the introduction of 
victims-witness assistance programs that are designed to provide support to a 
victim of crime throughout the court process. Compensation boards have also 
been set up to provide financial remuneration w those who have suffered injury or 
loss at the hands of the perpetrator of the crime. In the United States, however, a 
more aggressive scheme for providing victim redress has been adopted by a 
number of the state legislatures. These "Son of Sam" laws, named for the 
convicted New York killer David Berkowitz, operate to confiscate profits repead by 
offenders who choose to recount their criminal exploits. 
The author examines the development of these laws in the United States and 
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of such a scheme in the Canadian 
legal context. This discussion turns on the proposition that royalty stripping 
violates the right to freedom of expression, subject to the reasonable limit clause 
found in section I of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Three potential 
arguments under clause 1 are discussed in detail: institutional restrictions necessi-
tated by incarceration; victims' rights to receive compensation; and the principle 
of unjust enrichment. The author concludes that the "Son of Sam" laws have a 
disproportionate effect on freedom of expression and that they are not the best 
vehicle for furthering victims' rights. 
Depuis quelques annees, nous avons assiste a une demande accrue pour la 
protection des interets et des besoins des victimes d'actes criminels. Au Canada, 
plusieurs gouvernements ont adopte des programmes d'aide et de soutien pour les 
victimes appe/ees a temoigner. De plus, des organismes d'indemnisation ont vu le 
}our afin d'offrir des compensationsfinancieres aux personnes qui ont ete victimes 
de blessures ou de pertes matt!rielles. Par ailleurs, aux Etats- Unis, un systeme 
beaucoup plus agressif afin d'aider pareilles victimes a t!te t!labore par certains 
etats. Ces lois, surnommees "lois dufils de Sam" d'apres le nom du meurtrier 
new-yorkais David Berkowitz, visent ii. conJisquer /es profits realises par !es 
criminels qui choississent de devoiler leurs activites illicites. 
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L'auteur etudie /'elaboration de ces lois aux Etats- Unis et discute des avan-
tages et des inconvenients qui resulterait de !'adoption de lois sirnilaires au 
Canada. I! aborde la question de savoir si l'enlevement de royautes violerait le 
droit a la liberte d'expression garanti par la Charte canadienne des droits et 
libertes et sujet a la clause limitative prevueason article 1. Certainsdes arguments 
pouvant ltre developpes sous /'article 1 sont etudies en detail: restrictions institu-
tionnelles requises par !'incarceration, droit de la victime de recevoir compensa-
tion etprincipede l'enrichissement sans cause. L'auteur conclut queces loisont un 
ejfet disproportionne sur la liberte d'expression et qu'elles ne sont pas le meilleur 
moyen afin de faire avancer la cause par !es droits des victimes. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the emergence in the 1930s ofvictimology as a scholarly 
and academic field of study,1 there has been a growing public 
concern with the plight of victims of crime. It became increasingly 
apparent that the public law characterization of the criminal pro-
cess as a battle between state and accused resulted in the relegation 
of the victim to the role of a mere witness in the process with no 
recognizable interest in the outcome. In response to this problem, 
most countries enacted legislation to provide for compensation or 
reparation to victims. The compensation schemes found in various 
jurisdictions have different formulations, but two elements are 
common to all. First, as an adjunct to the sentencing process, 
convicted offenders may be ordered to pay compensation for prop-
erty loss and out-of-pocket expenses. Second, if the offender is not 
apprehended or convicted, there exists state-sponsored compensa-
tion administered by government agencies. The provision of com-
pensation from public funds usually allows for awards that are not 
restricted to property loss but include compensation for more 
intangible losses such as pain and suffering. 
Despite the best intentions of governments, many of these 
compensation schemes have been roundly criticized as being little 
more than token efforts to appease victims. 2 It has been argued that 
l. 
2. 
F~r a discussion of the rise of vict.imol_ogy, see R. Elias, The Politics of 
Victzmzzatwn (Oxford: Oxford Umvers1ty Press, 1986); I. Drapkin & E. 
Viano, eds., Victimology (Lexington: Lexington Press, 1974). 
See R. Elias, "Community Control, Criminal Justice and Victim Services" 
in E-, Fattah, ed., From Crime Policy to Victim Policy (New York: St. 
Martm's Press, 1986); P. Burns, Criminal Injuries Compensation (Vancou-
ver: Butterworths, 1980). 
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the state-sponsored schemes are too restrictive in scope and too 
parsimonious in their awards, and that this problem is aggravated 
b~ the fact that in most cases it is futile to seek compensation 
dlfectly from the offender because most offenders are destitute. In 
!hi~ p~p~r, w~ will exa~ine the novel approach adopted by many 
J:1nsd1.ct10ns m the United States to facilitate obtaining compensa-
t10n dtrectly from the offender. In the late 1970s state legislatures 
became enamoured with the idea of confiscating profits reaped by 
offenders who chose to write books describing their criminal ex-
ploits. The idea was to strip criminals of their royalties and to 
redistribute these funds to victims. 
Affectionately known as "Son of Sam "3 laws, these con-
fiscatory schemes have been applauded by some and condemned 
by others. The major source of discontent has been the belief that 
depriving offenders of part of the protective value of copyright in 
their books will deter criminal authors from writing, and society 
will lose the valuable criminological and sociological insights that 
these books are assumed to contain. As might be expected, this 
belief has crystallized into the constitutional claim that restrictions 
on publishing these crime stories are a violation of the offender's 
right to free expression and the public's corresponding right to 
receive information. There can be little doubt that the marketplace 
of ideas will be impaired if royalty stripping does effectively deter 
writing, but this in itself does not require the conclusion to be drawn 
that these schemes are unconstitutional. As with most constitu-
tional questions, the courts must perform a delicate balancing of 
competing rights and interests, and in this case the right to free 
expression collides with public demands that victims be accorded 
due respect and adequate assistance. 
. .In Canada, the issue of victims' rights has been the subject of 
s1gmficant law reform efforts.4 In addition, Parliament has recently 
3. 
4. 
This epithet is a reference to the serial killer David "Son of Sam" Berkowitz 
wh_o's_case prompted t~e New York Legislature to enact the first profit-
stnppmg statute. See discussion in R. Inz, "Compensating the Victims 
from the Proceeds of the Criminal's Story The Constitutionality of the 
New York Approach" (1978), 14 Colum. J. L. & Social Problems 93. 
Ii: l ?83 a Fe~eral/Provincial Task Force was set up to report on the status of 
v1ctims of cnme-: F_ederal Provincial Task Force on Justice for Victims of 
Crime (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1983). The most signifi-
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introduced legislation to confiscate the fruits of crime.5 The com-
bined interest in victims' rights and legislative reform designed to 
ensure that offenders do not profit from their wrongdoing suggests 
that lawmakers in Canada may be interested in adopting the Amer-
ican "Son of Sam" approach. In light of this possibility, whether 
remote or impending, this paper will discuss the constitutional 
obstacles to enacting this type oflegislation. The paper will begin by 
examining the development of these laws in the United States 
before turning to a discussion of the potential infringement of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter).6 On the 
assumption that a cogent argument can be made that royalty 
stripping violates the right to free expression, it will be necessary to 
examine the applicability of the reasonable limit clause found in 
section 1 of the Charter. Three potential claims will be examined 
with reference to section 1 of the Charter: that stripping criminals 
of book profits is a reasonable limit upon the right to free expression 
because this right is outweighed by (1) institutional restrictions 
upon the rights of prisoners as necessitated by the exigencies of 
incarceration; (2) the right of victims to receive compensation for 
losses occasioned by crime; and (3) the principle of unjust enrich-
ment - that no one should profit from their wrongdoing. It is 
hoped that this examination will show that Son of Sam laws are ill-
conceived and not a welcome addition to the well-founded objec-
tive of compensating victims of crime. 
2. CRIMINAL AUTHORS AND THE AMERICAN 
APPROACH 
Since the advent of print, there has been no shortage of pub-
lished crime stories. The publishing industry is eager to pander to 
our fascination with the dramatic content of crime, and we con-
sume these crime stories with great passion. Our fascination may 
cant development has been the introduction of a bill in Parliament to 
integrate victims into many aspects of the criminal justice system: Bill 
C-89, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (victims of crime), 2nd Sess., 
33rd Parl., 1986-87-88. 
5. Bill C-61, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Food and Drugs Act and 
the Narcotics Control Act, 2nd Sess., 33rd Parl., 1986-87. 
6. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11. 
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stem from something as basic as an inherent human interest in the 
struggle of good and evil, or the crime story may engage a more 
subtle and sophisticated interest in trying to understand the nature 
of defiance and rule-breaking. For whatever reason, stories ofcrime 
provide valued entertainment for many. 
Since there is a large and available commercial market for the 
sale of books regarding the exploits of criminals, it is not surprising 
that many people try to profit from publishing stories of sensational 
crimes. No one is immune from the lure of profit: in the eighteenth 
century even prison chaplains could amass considerable profits 
from publishing the last confessions of criminals awaiting execu-
tion. 7 As would be expected, criminals sentenced to lengthy prison 
sentences might find it profitable to spend their interminable days 
flexing new-found literary muscles in the hope of accumulating 
substantial royalty payments that would be available to them upon 
release from prison. 
In 1977, with the conviction of the notorious serial killer 
David Berkowitz (also known by the alias "Son of Sam"), the New 
York legislature was spurred into action when it became known 
that Berkowitz might collect large profits from a contract he en-
tered into for the publication of his account of his murders. Senator 
Emmanuel Gold sponsored a bill designed to strip the criminal 
author of the profits he expected to receive upon publication. The 
Senator stated: 
It is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency that an individual, such 
as the forty-four caliber killer, can expect to receive large sums of money 
for his story once he is captured - while five people are dead, other people 
injured as a result of his conduct. This bill would make it clear that in all 
criminal situations the victim must be more important than the criminal. 8 
Since the initiative taken in New York, over 20 states have 
enacted laws to prevent criminals from profiting from publication 
contracts. 9 Before turning to the mechanics of these statutory 
7. P. Linebaugh, "The Ordinary ofNewgate and His Account," in J. Cock-
burn, ed., Crime in England 1550-1880 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1977). 
8. Memorandum ofSenator Emanuel Gold, 1977 New York State Legislative 
Annual, p. 267. 
9. For complete citations to all existing statutes, see "Publication Rights 
Agreements in Sensational Criminal Cases: A Response to the Problem" 
{1983), 68 Cornell L. Rev. 686 at 687, note 6. 
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schemes, it must be mentioned that the Son of Sam incident was 
merely a catalyst for the regulation of a problem that had attracted 
public attention long before the arrival of Son of Sam. In the 
United States there are fewer restrictions on the form and structure 
of lawyers' retainers, and many clever attorneys realized that in 
cases of sensational criminal events they could secure payment of 
their fees by having the criminal assign his interest in any future 
publication contract. Whatever the ethical implications of these 
attorney-client life story fee agreements, 10 it became an accepted 
practice to use fee contracts that gave the attorney exclusive rights 
to a client's life story. 
Famous examples of these fee contracts are readily found. The 
convicted murderer of Martin Luther King, James Earl Ray, is 
known to have directed payment of at least $40,000 in royalties to 
his attorneys for the publishing of the story of his crime. 11 One 
member of the Manson family, Susan Atkin, who was convicted of 
the brutal slaying of Sharon Tate and others, directed payment of 
$52,500to her attorney and$131,250 toa trust for her son's benefit 
in exchange for an interview describing her involvement in the 
murder.12 The possibility of realizing upon the profits of criminal · 
authors has resulted in American lawyers exploiting this new-
found source of wealth. 
The recent case in California of the "Skid Row Stabber" 13 
illustrates the dangers of allowing lawyers to encourage clients to 
tum their crimes into publishing profits. In 1979 Bobby Joe Max-
well was charged with four counts of robbery and ten counts of 
murder. The indigent accused was only able to obtain the services 
of private counsel by means of a life story fee contract. Under the 
contract, the lawyers stood to gain 8 5 per cent of the net proceeds of 
any future publishing or film contract. Realizing that the contract 
10. For a discussion of the ethical implications of these arrangements, see L. 
Higgins, "Ethics - A Proposal for Judicial Condemnation of Attorney-
Client Life Story Fee Arrangements" (1984), 6 West New England L. Rev. 
851. 
11. J. Rothman, "In Cold Type: Statutory Approaches to the Problem of the 
Offender as Author" (1980), J. of Crim. Law & Criminology 255, note 2. 
12. Ibid. 
13. The accused was called the "Skid Row Stabber" after being charged ·with 
the deaths of 10 skid row derelicts in Los Angeles between Oct. 1978 and 
Jan. 1979. See discussion in Higgins, note 10, above, at pp. 853-857. 
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placed them in a position of conflict of interest, in that the lawyers 
might be seen as compromising the defence in order to increase 
book sales, the lawyers included in the retainer an express descrip-
tion of the potential conflicts of interest so that the client could 
effectively make an informed waiver of his right to have a conflict-
free attorney. The contract outlined three potential areas of 
conflict: 
1. the lawyers may have an interest to create publicity, which 
would increase the money that they might get as a result of 
this agreement, even if this publicity hurt Maxwell's 
defence; 
2. the lawyers may have an interest not to raise certain de-
fences that would question the sanity or mental capacity of 
Maxwell, because to raise these defences might make this 
agreement between the lawyers and Maxwell void or 
voidable by Maxwell; 
3. the lawyers may have an interest in having Maxwell con-
victed and even sentenced to death so that there would be 
increased publicity, which might mean that the lawyers 
would get more money as a result of this agreement. 14 
Iflawyers in America have no shame in admitting it is possible 
that they will not vigorously oppose the death penalty for their 
clients in order to realize greater profits from book sales, then, 
assuming that such disreputable conduct is a product of greed, 
there can be little doubt that there exists enormous potential for 
profit from criminal authors. The Son of Sam case was not a unique 
instance of criminal profiteering but is just the tip of the iceberg. In 
New York, the Crime Victims Board has already seized advances 
or royalties in seven cases, with the largest seizure being a sum of 
$100,000 paid by Warner Brothers to John Wojtowicz, whose 1972 
bank robbery became immortalized in the film Dog Day Afternoon. 
This money was ultimately distributed to the four bank employees 
who had been held hostage during the incident, to defence lawyers 
14. These are the exact terms of the contract as taken from .Maxwell v. Superior 
Court of Los Angeles Cty., 639 P. 2d 248 at 261 (1982). The upshot of the 
case was that the accused had knowingly waived his right to complain about 
his lawyer's conflict of interest. 
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and to the offender's former wife. 15 Stripping criminals ofliterary 
profits can evidently uncover sizeable sums that can be re-
distributed to victims. 
Most jurisdictions that have adopted a statutory scheme for 
the stripping of literary profits have closely followed the original 
plan advanced in New York.16 The common features of these 
schemes are as follows: 
1. anyone who contracts with a person accused or convicted 
of a crime with respect to the re-enactment of the crime by 
way of book, magazine, record or film, or with respect to 
the expression of the accused's thoughts or feelings about 
the crime by way of book etc., is required to deposit the 
proceeds from such contract with an administrative 
agency that is responsible for administering victim com-
pensation schemes; 
2. any funds deposited are held in escrow for five years; 
3. the administrative agency is required periodically to post 
notices in newspapers of general circulation to notify vic-
tims that these funds may be available; 
4. any victim who has obtained judgment in a civil proceed-
ing against the off ender may apply to the Board for release 
of money held in the escrow account to satisfy the 
judgment. 
It should be noted that, if an accused person is acquitted, most 
jurisdictions require that the funds in the escrow account be re-
turned to the offender; however, some jurisdictions contain a puz-
zling provision that allows for this money to be forfeited to the 
state.17 In addition, most jurisdictions allow for the convicted 
offender to apply periodically for release of some of the money for 
the purpose of paying attorney fees or to satisfy orders of compen-
sation or restitution that are made at the time of sentencing. lt is 
interesting to note that courts have interpreted these schemes to 
extend any statutory limitations that victims face with respect to 
15. S. Roberts, "Criminals, Authors and Criminal Authors," March 3, 1987, 
N.Y. Times Book Review, pp. I, 34. 
16. N.Y. Exec. Law, ss. 620-635 (Mc.Kinney 1982). 
17. See, e.g., Ala. Code, s. 41-9-82. 
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civil suits that are brought against the offender. By judicial con-
struction, any statutory limitation periods begin to run only from 
the time the escrow account is established and not from the usual 
starting point of when the cause of action has arisen.18 
Any divergencies in these statutes concern the mode of dis-
tributing the funds in the escrow account at the end of the five-year 
period. There are three basic methods of distribution. 
1. Type 1 - All victims with outstanding civil judgments are 
given a pro rata share of the proceeds and any remaining 
funds are returned to the offender. 19 
2. Type 2 - Funds are distributed to various different classes 
of individuals in addition to distribution to victims. In 
Florida, for example, funds are distributed as follows: 25 
per cent to dependents of the accused; 2 5 per cent to 
victims and their dependants to the extent of their 
damages as ascertained by the Court; 50 per cent to the 
state for its costs in prosecuting and incarcerating the 
offender; any remaining funds are then returned to the 
offender. 20 
3. Type 3 - Funds are distributed to victims exclusively, or 
to different classes of individuals or groups in designated 
shares, and any remaining funds are forfeited to the state. 21 
It is important to distinguish between these three types of 
distribution because they may have distinct constitutional implica-
tions. If the temporary deprivation of access to publishing profits is 
a violation of freedom of speech, it is necessary under both Amer-
ican and Canadian jurisprudence to determine whether there is a 
pressing or compelling state interest that outweighs the societal 
interest in free expression. The type 1 mode of distribution is 
evidently directed exclusively towards assisting victims, and one 
would then balance victims' rights against free speech. Under types 
2 and 3, it is unclear whether the legislation is premised upon 
18. Barrett v. Wojtowitz, 404 N.Y.S. 2d 829 (1978). 
19. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Law, s. 632-a. 
20. Fla. Stat., s. 944.512 (Supp. 1979). 
2L See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., s. 13-4202(D)-(E) (1978) and Ala. Code, s. 
41-9-82 (Supp. 1981). 
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victims' rights, or whether this concern is only incidental to a 
notion of forfeiture based upon the principle that no one should be 
permitted to profit from the wrong. If the latter interpretation is 
right, then the issue is far more confusing, as it would be necessary 
first to ask whether literary profits are profits from crime or 
whether they are too indirectly connected to the crime to fall within 
the principle. If the connection is determined to be direct and not 
conceptually remote, then it would be necessary to balance the 
common-law principle of unjust enrichment against free speech. 
Before one em barks upon an analysis of the constitutionality 
of these schemes, it should be noted that from one perspective this 
entire issue is just a tempest in a teapot. In actuality these schemes 
do not significantly modify the standard civil process for collecting 
upon outstanding judgments. In order to trigger application of 
these schemes, the victim still must successfully litigate his or her 
claims, and the establishment of an escrow account merely facili-
tates execution of the judgment by freezing the offender's assets for 
a period of five years. It is, however, misleading to assert that the 
schemes are mere enhancers of ordinary civil procedure. At the 
outset one must question why the decision to render execution of 
civil judgments more effective is limited only to assets or profits 
reaped from publishing. The establishment of escrow accounts 
should logically apply to any windfall funds that the offender may 
receive while incarcerated. Undoubtedly, the notoriety oflife story 
fee contracts has highlighted the obvious fact that offenders can 
reap enormous profits from the decision to publish, but this does 
not justify the singling out of publishing profits as the only profits to 
be made readily available to victims. 
The second anomaly that runs counter to the characterization 
of the scheme as a mere civil process enhancer is the fact that the 
state, under some statutory formulations, is an actual beneficiary of 
the profits. It is surely a rare occurrence for the state to have any 
outstanding cause of action against an offender as a result of the 
commission of the crime. The Son of Sam laws are thus not merely 
technical reformulations of the rules of civil procedure. The critical 
inquiry must revolve around whether profit stripping is tanta-
mount to the silencing of an individual who deserves to be punished 
but who nonetheless remains entitled to contribute to the mar-
ketplace of expressive activity. 
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3. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The hallmark of any parliamentary democracy is the right of 
citizens to engage freely in debate and other expressive activities. 
This trite observation must be accompanied by another equally 
trite one: that the freedom to engage in expressive activities is not 
absolute and there will be numerous occasions when an overriding 
public interest will justify restrictions on the right to speak. The 
focus of this inquiry will be on the right of criminals to publish 
materials describing their criminal exploits and the corresponding 
right of citizens to receive this information. The controversial Son 
of Sam laws not only affect the right of criminals to speak and the 
right of citizens to receive, but also potentially infringe the right of 
the press to collect and disseminate information freely. This latter 
right will not be discussed, but it can be safely said that analyzing 
the public interest in freedom of the press will engage the same 
balancing considerations employed in analyzing the public's free 
speech or expression interests. 
Two distinct issues must be addressed in the analysis of 
whether literary profit stripping violates section 2 of the Charter. 
First, one must examine if the content of the speech deserves 
constitutional protection. Content-based distinctions22 carry the 
danger of allowing state prioritization of our right to speak 
However, it must be recognized that there are classes of speech that 
have traditionally been excluded from constitutional protection, 
and we need to know if profit-motivated descriptions of criminal 
infliction of injuries are exempt from protection. Assuming that 
these autobiographical crime stories are deserving of protection, 
one must then address the second question: whether the scheme to 
redistribute publishing profits impairs the exercise of the right to 
free expression. It must be remembered that these schemes do not 
prohibit speech directly; rather, they merely make the exercise of 
speech less profitable. Does the removal of the potential for profit 
deter the exercise of our rights, or is it merely an incidental burden 
that the Charter will tolerate? 
Although the analysis need not begin with an examination of 
American jurisprudence, Canadian courts struggling in this for-
22. See discussion in G. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment 
(1983), 25 William and Mary L.Rev. 189. 
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mative period of Charter jurisprudence have found it helpful to 
refer to and incorporate American case law. 23 At least at the level of 
rhetoric, the Americans have elevated the right of free speech to the 
position of a "preferred freedom".24 The courts purport to safe-
guard this right zealously, believing that infringement offree speech 
will surely bring about the downfall of the republic. The First 
Amendment is designed "to secure the widest possible dissemina-
tion ofinformation from diverse and antagonistic sources"25 and to 
"assure a society in which uninhibited, robust and wide open 
debate concerning matters of public interest would thrive, for only 
in such a society can a healthy representative democracy flour-
ish. " 26 Whether or not the American courts have in practice ex-
tended the fullest protection to this right, anyone who seriously 
contends that Son of Sam laws would violate the prescriptions of 
the Charter must account for the fact that the American courts 
have not yet impugned the integrity of these literary profit-stripping 
schemes. 
It is surprising that few people have attacked the constitu-
tionality of these laws, and in fact the only case that seriously 
discusses First Amendment concerns reached the conclusion that 
these laws are constitutionally valid. In Fasching v. Kallinger, 27 the 
New Jersey Superior Court upheld the constitutionality of a "type 
2" New Jersey statute28 requiring the depositing of publication 
23. For cases approving of resort to American jurisprudence, see R. v. Carter 
(1982), 39 O.R. (2d) 439 at 441, 2 C.C.C. (3d) 412 at 415 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. 
Therens, [1983] 4 W.W.R. 385 at405, 5 C.C.C. (3d) 409 at 428 (Sask. C.A.); 
Hunter, Dir. of Investigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch v. 
Southam Inc., [1984) S.C.R. 145, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (sub nom. Dir. of Inves-
tigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch v. Southam Inc.). It 
should be noted that the First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion refers to freedom of speech and the Canadian Charter refers to freedom 
ofexpression; presumably our formulation suggests a more expansive right, 
but we will proceed on the assumption that there is no significant distinc-
tion in the formulation of the rights. 
24. R. McKay, "ThePreferenceforFreedom"(l959), 34 N.Y.U. L. Rev.1182. 
25. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 49 (1976). 
26. Ibid., p. 93, note 127. 
27. 510 A. 2d 694 (1986). 
28. N.J. Stat. Ann. Title 52:48-26. The New Jersey statute contains a "type 2" 
mode of distribution in that the funds are distributed in the following 
priority: I) to satisfy the civil judgments of victims; 2) to satisfy a court 
order ofrestitution; 3) to offset reasonable costs incurred by the board in 
administering the statute. 
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profits from the book The Shoemaker in an escrow account. The 
book is an examination of the background and behaviour of the 
convicted murderer Joseph Kallinger. 29 The publisher contracted 
with Kallinger to provide him with 12 per cent of the profits 
received by the author in exchange for Kallinger's provision of 
information to the author. Kallinger in tum assigned his rights to 
the contract to his attorney. 
The defendant argued that the scheme violated the First 
Amendment in that it inhibited the publication oflegitimate stud-
ies of the criminal mind by removing the economic incentive that 
may prompt criminals to co-operate in providing necessary infor-
mation. The court's response focused on the proposition that the 
statute does not directly and completely prohibit speech as it is a 
reasonable "time, place and manner" restriction. 30 Those writers 
who want to publish studies of the criminal mind are still permitted 
to do so by ensuring that the story does not constitute a re-enact-
ment of a particular crime, or by ensuring that any re-enactment 
does not engage the services of the offender. If the writer finds these 
alternatives unacceptable, he or she may still publish the works 
with the only restriction being that the offender will have to forfeit 
his proceeds. 
The Court funher reasoned that, if the restrictions were tanta-
mount to an impairment of the right, then the impairment was 
justified on the basis that the state had a compelling interest in 
preventing criminals from profiting from crime and that this stat-
ute was narrowly drawn to achieve this pressing objective. In 
addition, the Court believed that this was a case of mere commer-
cial speech that would not be afforded the full protection of the First 
Amendment. This decision was ultimately reversed on other 
grounds and the appellate court found no reason to tum to the First 
Amendment considerations. 31 
Books and films that describe the background and behaviour 
of offenders are undoubtedly properly classified as forms of ex-
29. For a discussion of the Kallinger case, see A. Cartwright, "Crime Doesn't 
Pay: Authors and Publishers Cannot Profit From A Criminal's Story" 
(1987), 55 Cincim:iaJiL.Rev. 831. 
30. Ibid., p. 838. 
31. Note27,above. 
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pression; however, many believe that freedom of expression is 
limited to freedom of useful expression. Although the constitu-
tional guarantee does not draw a distinction between useful and 
useless expression, this distinction has been grounded on the view 
that rights of free speech are political rights that must be respected 
in order to maintain an open society based upon representative 
democracy. Accordingly, if the speech in question does not serve 
the purpose offurthering political debate, then it is a form of speech 
deserving less, or even no, protection. As Meiklejohn says: 
The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the 
program of self-government. .. .It is a deduction from the basic American 
agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage .... The 
guarantee given by the First Amendment is not, then, assured to all 
speaking. It is assured only to speech which bears, directly or indirectly, 
upon issues with which voters have to deal - only, therefore, to the 
consideration of matters of public interest. 32 
Accordingly, the American courts have been comfortable in 
assigning priorities to various forms of speech: political speech 
deserves the fullest protection, non-political speech deserves less 
protection, and speech devoid of social value is altogether excluded 
from the First Amendment.33 The view that free speech interests 
merely serve political interests has been criticized as failing to take 
into account the true nature of freedom and its importance in 
developing respect for the autonomy and self-actualization of the 
individual. 34 A less restrictive view of the purp'ose offree expression 
sees four potential values in protecting rights of expression: 
The values sought by society in protecting the right to freedom of ex-
pression may be grouped into four broad categories. Maintenance of a 
system of free expression is necessary (1) as assuring individual s~lf­
fulfillment, (2) as a means ofattaining the truth, (3) as a method of secunng 
participation by the members of the society in social, including political, 
32. A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 27, 79. . 
33. For example, the United States Supreme Court has excluded certam classes 
of speech from the protection of the Constitution: "the lewd and obscene, 
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting words": Beauharn.ais 
v. Illinois, 72 S. Ct. 725 (1952). An example ofa class of speech deservmg 
some protection, but not the full panoply, is commercial speech: see note 
47, below. 
34. T. Scanlon, "A Theory of Freedom of Expression" (1972), 1 Phil. & Pub. 
Aff. 204. 
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decisionmaking, and (4) as maintaining the balance between stability and 
change.35 
The position of Canadian courts to date is difficult to ascer-
tain. What they say seems to indicate a preference for the view that 
free expression is concerned with political expression, but what 
they have actually done is extend the protection to a variety of 
expressive messages. In 1951 Rand J. noted on behalf of the Su-
preme Court of Canada that "freedom in thought and speech and 
disagreement in ideas and beliefs, on every conceivable subject, are 
of the essence of our life" [emphasis added]. 36 Despite the breadth 
of this statement, the Ontario Court of Appeal is correct in asserting 
that "the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have adopted the 
rationale that freedom of expression is essential to the working of a 
parliamentary democracy". 37 In the most significant post-Charter 
case that discusses freedom of expression, the Dolphin Delivery 
case, 38 the Supreme Court of Canada approved of earlier judicial 
comments linking free speech with "matters of public policy and 
public administration"39 and "political expression of the primary 
condition of social life". 40 
Aside from this rhetoric, it is illuminating to note that in the 
Dolphin Delivery case the Court actually held that secondary pick-
eting engages free expression interests because "picketers would be 
conveying a message which at a very minimum would be classed as 
persuasion, aimed at deterring customers from doing business with 
the respondent".41 The position that free expression extends far 
beyond political debate is reflected in Canadian decisions that have 
found Charter violations in laws that prohibit prostitutes from 
communicating with customers,42 and in the Criminal Code pro-
hibition on the dissemination of obscene material. 43 Some of these 
35. Emerson, "Towards a General Theory of the First Amendment" (1962-63), 
72 Yale L.J. 877 at 878. 
36. Boucher v. R., [1951] S.C.R. 265 at 288. 
37. R. v. Zundel (1987), 58 O.R. (2d) 129 at 148, 31 C.C.C. (3d) 97 at 116 (Ont. 
C.A.). 
38. R. W.D.S. U., Loe. 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1987] 1 W.W.R. 577. 
39. Quoting from Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285 at 326. 
40. Ibid., p. 306. 
41. Dolphin Delivery, note 38, above, at p. 588. 
42. See, e.g., R. v. Skinner (1987), 58 C.R. (3d) 137 (N.S. C.A.); R. v. Jahelka 
(1987), 58 C.R. (3d) 164 (Alta. C.A.). 
43. In R. v. Red Hot Video Ltd. (1985), 45 C.R. (3d) 36 (B.C. C.A.), the Court 
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cases have found that the Charter violation is a reasonable limit 
under section 1 of the Charter,44 but the consensus appears to be 
that "freedom of expression is a right of everyone and is not limited 
to debate of high principles or policy".45 
If the Charter protects solicitation by prostitutes, then it must 
a fortiori extend to crime stories authored by criminals. It must be 
beyond dispute that these stories or studies are not without redeem-
ing social value, and that they contribute to valuable sociological 
explorations. As one writer has noted: 
As a general matter, the publication of such works is desirable for a number 
of reasons. They may communicate ideas and information to the public 
that will inform debate on important questions. They may provide infor-
mation that law enforcement agencies and criminologists would find 
useful in combatting or studying crime. They may have the effect of 
discouraging others from engaging in criminal conduct. They may have 
literary or other artistic or cultural value. The process of creation may have 
a rehabilitative effect on the authors. The fact that any particular work fails 
to accomplish any or all of these objectives is not a reason for discouraging 
publication of the entire genre. 46 
The New Jersey Superior Court was probably well aware of 
these social benefits, but it was unduly affected by the fact that the 
criminal author would in most cases be more concerned with 
publishing profits than with these social values. Whether or not this 
is a correct assumption, it appears to have led the Court to conclude 
that these publications fall into the category of commercial speech, 
and thus are deserving of less protection. In the United States the 
last decade has seen a judicial debate concerning the proper ap-
proach to valuing commercial speech, and the conclusion has been 
reached that this form of speech is deserving of some lesser degree 
of protection.47 A similar debate has emerged in Canada: the 
Ontario Divisional Court has concluded that commercial speech is 
excluded from protection, 48 while the Quebec Court of Appeal 
assumed that obscene publications fell within the scope of s. 2 of the 
Charter. 
44. Jahelka, note 42, above, and Red Hot Video, note 43 above. 
45. Skinner, note 42, above, at p. 159. 
46. J. McCamus, "Recovery of the Indirect Profits of Wrongful Killing: The 
New Constructive Trust and the Olson Case" (1985), 20 E.T.R. 165at173. 
4 7. For a brief discussion of the American case law, see S. Braun, "Should 
Commercial Speech Be Accorded Prima Facie Constitutional Recognition 
UndertheCharterofRightsand Freedoms?" (1986), 18 Ottawa L. Rev. 37. 
48. Re Klein and L.S. UC. (1985), 50 O.R. (2d) 118. 
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recently held that "there is no rule of interpretation that would 
exclude commercial expression from freedom of expression". 49 
There is no need to engage in a lengthy analysis of this debate, 
because the characterization of crime stories as commercial speech 
is wholly misconceived. This characterization is premised upon the 
belief that an expressive message becomes commercial speech if the 
sole motivation behind the expression is one of profit. Surely the 
profit motive is irrelevant to the proper characterization of the 
content of the speech. The critical factor in assessing the content of 
speech is the public's right to know - a right that is assessed 
independently of the motivation of the speaker. The public is 
entitled to information that may be of value to it, and this entitle-
ment is an implied component of the right to free expression: 
The obverse of the concept of freedom of expression is the right of the 
person to receive the message expressed; the right of the public and indi-
viduals to know what is being expressed by others with a message to 
communicate applies equally to the democratic political process ... and as 
in my opinion to the pit and thrust of economic competition in a free 
market economy.50 
The potential for reaping profit from expression does not 
convert expression into a less-protected commercial enterprise 
because "no weight is ascribed to the fact that petitioners have 
profited from the sale of publications" and "commercial activity, 
in itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of ex-
pression secured by the First Amendment". 51 A form of expression 
only becomes commercial expression that is deserving ofless pro-
tection when the message is "one which has as its purpose the 
proposal of an economic transaction .... one which promotes or 
attempts to entice a specific decision on the part of the recipient of 
the message to agree to an economic exchange of money in return 
for goods or services". 52 Commercial expression is a form of adver-
49. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.) (1986), 32 D.L.R. (4th) 64ln. 
50. Klein, note 48, above, at p. 129. The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that 
free speech includes a right to know in Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S. Ct. 1243 
(1969). 
51. Ginzburgv. U.S., 383 U.S. 463at474 (1966),quotedin Irwin Toy, note 49, 
above, at p. 665. 
52. R Sharpe, "Commercial Expression and the Charter" (1987), 37 U. ofT. 
L.J. 229 at 230. 
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tising or solicitation, but it does not embrace stories or studies 
published with a view to profit. 
The presence of the profit motive does, however, relate to 
another aspect of the analysis of free expression. Assuming that this 
form of speech is covered by section 2 of the Charter, one must ask 
whether a literary profit-stripping scheme infringes upon this right. 
It must be remembered that the legislation does not prohibit the 
criminal from disseminating information concerning his be-
haviour; it merely makes this enterprise less profitable. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has commented that "freedom of speech presup-
poses a willing speaker", 53 and one must question the willingness of 
a speaker who will speak only if he is given a guarantee of profit. In 
an ideal world, all speakers would surely wish to contribute their 
thoughts regardless of profit, but it is unrealistic to disregard the 
strong influence of commercial motivations that exist in this world 
and to restrict the right of free speech to those who are motivated 
solely by noble aspirations. 
It is obvious that "artistic or cultural expression very often has 
a commercial purpose", 54 and that the denial of an opportunity to 
profit will deter many speakers from engaging in the often arduous 
enterprise of expressing themselves. In a case questioning the con-
stitutionality of the Ontario Censor Board, an argument was ad-
vanced that a statutory scheme of prior restraint and censorship is 
acceptable because it applies only to those who seek to exhibit films 
in public for profit. The response of the Court is wo~h quoting in its 
entirety: 
Counsel for the Crown argued that the limits are reasonable since they 
curtail only the freedom of those who wish to exhibit films to the P1;1blic or 
for gain. He points out that any one can make films, show them pnvately, 
rent them and sell them. Hence, it is said the freedom of expression is only 
curtailed to the extent that a person wishes to exhibit film to the public or 
for profit. It would be fair to assume that the prime purpose of 1'.laking films 
is to exhibitthem to the public. Ifa film-maker cannot show his film to the 
public there is little point in making it. Moreover, the profi~ motive cannot 
be a valid reason to prevent a film-maker from showmg his work, for one 
who shows film for profit can have no less freedom of expression than one 
who does so not for profit. The extent of freedom of expression cannot 
53. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, 
425 U.S. 748 at 756 (1976). 
54. Irwin Toy, note 48, above, at p. 652. 
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depend on that, for there is nothing wrong with making a profit from one's 
art or one's ideas.55 
It may be argued that profit-stripping schemes do not have as 
their purpose the restriction of free speech, but the Supreme Court 
of Canada has made it perfectly clear that "both purpose and effect 
are relevant in determining constitutionality".56 If the effect of 
removing the potential for profit is to deter publication, then the 
scheme is unconstitutional. The relevant question is whether the 
right is unduly burdened, and the Supreme Court has aptly noted 
that "it matters not. . . whether a coercive burden is direct or 
indirect, intentional or unintentional, foreseeable or unforeseea-
ble".57 Restrictions on amounts of money that can be spent on 
expressive activity have been recognized as unconstitutional.58 
Surely the converse is equally true: restrictions upon the amount of 
money that can be earned through expressive activity unduly bur-
den free speech. It would be difficult to verify statistically the 
deterrent impact of Son of Sam laws, but it would be counter-
intuitive to assert that the laws do not create any disincentive to 
publishing. American publishers have expressed their dissatisfac-
tion with the operation of these laws, and there is at least one 
documented example of a criminal author postponing the publica-
tion of her book as a direct result of these laws. 59 
It thus appears that these laws do run counter to the guarantee 
of free expression, and the next inquiry requires an examination of 
55. Re Ont. Film & Video Appreciation Soc. and Ont. Bd. ofCensors(l983), 41 
O.R. (2d) 583 at 591 (Ont. Div. Ct.), affinned45 O.R. (2d) 80 (Ont. C.A.). 
56. R. v. Big M Drug Mart (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321at350 (S.C.C.). 
57. R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 at 759, 30 C.C.C. (3d) 
385 at 418 (sub nom. Edwards Books and Art Ltd. v. R.). In a similar vein, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has commented that "freedoms such as these ~re 
protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from bemg 
stifled by more subtle governmental interference": Bates v. Little Rock, 36 l 
U.S. 516, 523 (1960). 
58. Nat. Citizens' Coalition Inc.!Coafition Nationale des Citoyens Inc. v. A.G. 
Canada, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 436 (Alta. Q.B.); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. l 
(1976). 
59. The Scarsdale Murderess, Jean Harris, has been advised to hold off pub-
lishing her account of the murder: see S. Clark, "The Son of ~am. Laws: 
When the Lunatic, the Criminal, and the Poet are of Imagmat10n all 
Compact" (1983), 27 St. Louis U. L.J. 297, 222; Roberts, note 15,above, at 
p. 35. -. ... / 
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whether the restriction on the right is a reasonable limit under 
section 1 of the Charter. Before turning to this issue, we should note 
in passing the irony of the cqnclusion that a denial of profit is an 
unconstitutional restriction on speech. The ability to profit from 
one's literary labours is an incidental but inextricable part of the 
protection provided by copyright laws that guarantee the author 
the "sole right to produce or reproduce the work". 60 By concluding 
that a stripping of literary profits is an unconstitutional burden 
upon free speech, we have implicitly elevated copyright protection 
to constitutional status; we move towards the American position 
that "copyright is the engine of free expression". 61 The irony of this 
development is that copyright has traditionally been viewed as 
standing in an irreconcileable tension with the right to free ex-
pression. Allowing an author to possess exclusive rights to his or her 
labour may encourage creative endeavours; however, the existence 
of a monopoly over the dissemination of information is contrary to 
the public's right to receive and know. This tension has been 
mediated in copyright law by the development of doctrines such as 
fair use, or fair dealing, and the idea/expression dichotomy. 62 The 
upshot of a ruling that Son of Sam laws violate the constitution is a 
strengthening of the protection of copyright, and this strengthening 
may be justified partially on the basis of the public's right to receive 
information concerning crime, notwithstanding the traditional 
concern that copyright may sometimes jeopardize the free flow of 
information to the public. In analyzing the constitutionality of Son 
of Sam laws, we are faced with the anomaly that the public's right 
to know is presented as a justification for strengthening copyright 
protection, even though this right to receive information has more 
traditionally been seen as a reason for limiting the scope and 
protection of copyright. 
60. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 30, s. 3. 
61. D. Shipley, "Copyright & The First Amendment After Harper and Row v. 
Nation Enterprises" (1986), Brigham Young U. L. Rev. 983 at 1024. 
62. See H. Hoberman, "Copyright and the First Amendment: Freedom or 
Monopoly of Expression" (1987), 14 Pepperdine L. Rev. 571; for a Cana-
dian case in which the doctrine of fair dealing is discussed in the con text of a 
Charter challenge, seeR. v. James Lorimer & Co. (1984), 77 C.P.R. (2d) 262 
(Fed. C.A.). 
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4. SECTION I OF THE CHARTER AND THE 
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROFIT STRIPPING 
Once it is established that Son of Sam laws do violate the 
Charter it is incumbent upon the Crown to prove that this limita-
tion up~n the right of free expression is a "reasonable limit that is 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". The 
Supreme Court of Canada has clearly established the test for a 
showing that an infringement is justified: 
Two requirements must be satisfied to establish that.a limi.t is rea.sonable 
and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. First, the 
legislative objective which the limitati~n ~s designed. to i:iromo~ must be of 
sufficient importance to warrant ovemdmg a constitutional nght. It must 
bear on a "pressing and substantial concei:n". Secondly, th~ means chosen 
to attain those objectives must be proport10nal or appropnate to the ends. 
The proportionality requirement, in tu~, normally ~as three aspects: the 
limiting measures must be carefully d~s1gned, ?r rat10nall;: connected, t.o 
the objective· they must impair the nght as httle as possible; and their 
effects must ~ot so severely trench on individual or group ri~ts that the 
legislative objective, albeit important, is nevertheless outweighed by the 
abridgement of rights. 63 
Once this test is pruned of its redundancies, it is apparent that 
there are two major concerns that must be addressed. First, the 
Court must engage in a balancing exercise to determine ifthe state 
objective outweighs the violated right. If the objective is of greater 
importance, it will be upheld if, and only if, the legi~lative scheme 
to implement the objective is narrowly drawn to achieve the stated 
purpose. The critical question is then "wh~t alternative m~asures 
for implementing the objective were available to the legislators 
when they made their decisions".64 With this framework in mind, 
we will examine three possible justifications for profit-stripping: (a) 
the status of being convicted of crime entails a corresponding loss of 
rights; (b) unjust enrichment; and (c) victims' rights. 
(a) CoJJateral Consequences of Conviction 
Confiscation of literary profits falls historically within the 
powers that states have exercised to confiscate the property of 
convicted felons. Two well-accepted claims have been advanced to 
63. Edwards Books & Art, note 57, above, at p. 768 (S.C.R.), p. 425 (C.C.C.). 
64. Skinner, note 42, above, at p. 160. 
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justify this scheme. First, it was accepted that the prisoner forfeited 
his entitlement to rights ordinarily held by citizens. Second, in 
addition to this loss of status, it could be.said that the institutional 
exigencies of incarceration required that most rights be suspended 
or bestowed at the discretion of the prison administration. These 
collateral consequences of conviction, which operate above and 
beyond the designated punishment of incarceration, have come 
under attack in the past two decades, with the result that one's 
status as prisoner has been held not to outweigh one's right to free 
expression. 
Our penal heritage includes not only barbarous punishment, 
but also a notion of civil death65 that resulted in a corresponding 
loss of political rights, the right to inherit or bestow inheritances, 
and the loss of various legal rights including the right to sue. 66 
Attendant upon conviction for a capital offence was the practice of 
attainder, under which the offender forfeited all of his property to 
the King. By the end of the nineteenth century the general forfeiture 
of property upon conviction was abolished in Canada and Eng-
land. 67 All that remained were specific and discrete forfeitures that 
were_ triggered by proof of designated prerequisites (for example, 
forfeiture of any conveyance proved to be used in the transporta-
tion of narcotics6s). 
The abolition of civil death did not result in the elevation of the 
prisoner to the status of citizen with his or her full panoply of rights. 
Lawmakers still operated on the assumption that prisoners re-
mained "slaves of the state"69 and, when prison litigation began to 
flourish in the United States in the 1950s, the courts at first re-
65. See, M. Damaska, "Adverse Legal Consequences ofConviction" (1968) 59 
J. of Crim. L., Criminology and Political Science 351; J. Gobert and' N. 
Cohen, Rights ?f Prisoners (Colorado Springs: McGraw-Hill, 1981), para. 
2.0 I. The provmce of Quebec retained a form of civil death until finally 
abolished in 1971: S.Q. 1971, c. 84, s. 13. 
66. Ironically, civil death also included immunity from lawsuit, which would 
defeat the claims of victims. 
67. In England, the State ceased the practice of forfeiture of the convicted 
felon's property in 1870 with the enactment of33 & 34 Viet. c. 23, and in 
Canada the concept of "corruption of blood" was abolished with the 
enactment of our first Criminal Code in 1892. 
68. Narcotics Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1, ss. 10-11. 
69. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21Gratt)790 at 796 (1871). 
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sponded by simply deferring to the decision of penal admin-
istrators. This deference eventually crystallized into the "hands-
off" doctrine. 70 The Canadian judiciary followed the lead of Amer-
ican courts. They developed the position that they would not 
review decisions made by prison administrators that affected sub-
stantive rights of prisoners. The attitude of the Canadian courts was 
reflected in the following pronouncement by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal: 
Since his right to liberty is for the time being non-existent, all decisions of 
the officers of the Penitentiary Service with respect to the place and manner 
of confinement are the exercise of an authority which is purely admin-
istrative, provided that such decisions do not otherwise transgress rights 
conferred or preserved by the Penitentiary Act. 71 
In other words, the classic position on prisoners' rights was 
that they retained only rights that were specifically preserved by 
statute; all other rights were forever abandoned during incarcera-
tion. However, in the United States, the due process revolution of 
the Warren court in the 1960s had a significant impact upon 
prisoners' rights, and slowly but surely the courts began to oversee 
the decisions of prison administrators. In fact, every facet of prison 
administration eventually came under constitutional scrutiny, and 
the hands-off doctrine was replaced by an activist stance on the part 
of the judiciary. Under the "totality of circumstances" doctrine,72 
the courts closely monitored prison conditions to determine if they 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. If anv violations were 
detected, the courts were not reluctant to order affirmative relief 
that extended as far as requiring the prisons to construct new 
buildings, despite the fiscal pressures that state legislatures claimed 
as an obstacle to constitutional compliance. 73 
70. Gobert and Cohen, note 65, above, para. 1.02. 
71. R. v. Institutional Head of Beaver Creek Correctional Camp, [1969] I O.R. 
373 at 379, 2 D.L.R. (3d) 545 at 551 (Ont. C.A.). 
72. See Robbins and Buser, "Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement" 
(1977), 29 Stan. L. Rev. 893; Forman, "The Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Proscription: Evolving Standards of Decency" (1973), 19 Loyola L. 
Rev. 81; Collins, "The Defence Perspective in Prison Conditions Cases," in 
Robbins, ed., Prisoners and the Law (1985). Collins comments that "the 
totality of prison conditions approach gave the bench license to evaluate 
virtually every aspect of the prison, even though specific areas would be of 
no constitutional significance if they were evaluated alone" (at 7-5). 
73. See, e.g., Collins, note 72, above, at 7-4 to 7-S; Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 
362 at 385 (1970). 
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With respect to First Amendment rights, the courts operated 
upon the new assumption that these rights were retained and could 
only be curtailed upon a showing of institutional exigencies: 
In the first amendment context a corollary of this principle is that a prison 
inmate retains those first amendment rights that are not inconsistent with 
his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the 
corrections system. Thus challenges to prison restrictions t~at are asserted 
to inhibit First Amendment interests must be analysed m terms of the 
legitimate policies and goals of the ~rrect_ions system, to :whose custody 
and care the prisoner has been committed m accordance with due process 
eflaw.74 
Accordingly, the denial of the right of a prisoner to receive inf orma-
tion or mere correspondence, or to correspond or write with a view 
to publication, could be justified only if the state could show that 
this denial was absolutely necessary for institutional security or if 
the exercise of the right would be counter-productive to the re-
habilitation of the prisoner.75 
Once again, the Canadian courts followed the lead of the 
Americans. In the pre-Charter jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
of Canada established that decisions of prison administrators were 
subject to judicial review, 76 and that inmates retained all civil rights 
except those expressly or implicitly removed by statute. 77 The 
advent of the Charter further strengthened the status of prisoners as 
rights-bearing citizens, and the position that rights may only be 
curtailed on the basis of institutional necessity now appears well 
entrenched: 
Moreover, simply because remanded inmates retai1:1 certain co~st!tutional 
rights does not mean that these rights are not subject to rest!'lct1ons and 
limitations. Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or 
limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the 
74. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 at 822 (1974). 
75. See Gobert and Cohen, note 65, above, at para. 4.05. In this section, the 
authors discuss cases dealing with prisoners' writing for publication. For 
the most part, inmates have been allowed to write and J?U?lish; ~o_wever, 
there are examples given of institutions that ?:;tve proh1b1~ed wntm~ en-
tirely, presumably on the basis that the wntmg is cons~dered anti-re-
habilitative because it may glorify or justify the author's cnmes. 
76. Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Bd., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602, 13 
C.R. (3d) 1. 
77. This proposition emerges implicitly from the case of So/osky v. R. ~19_79), 
SOC.CC. (2d)495 (S.C.C.), in which theSupremeCourtplacedrestnctmns 
upon the power of prison officials to censor inmate correspondences. 
STRIPPING CRIMINALS OF THEIR LITERARY PROFITS 49 
considerations underlying our penal system .... [T]he maintaining of in-
stitutional security and preserving [of] internal order and discipline are 
essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained 
constitutional rights. 78 
The focus of inquiry has now changed so that state officials 
bear the burden of justifying Charter violations with respect to 
offenders. The recent flurry of right-to-vote cases for prisoners79 
indicates that it is now improper merely to assert that the loss of the 
right is a collateral consequence of conviction: it must be shown 
that the right to vote cannot be exercised because it will jeopardize 
institutional security. Similarly, a prohibition on the publication of 
books by inmates can be justified only if it raises security problems 
or is counter-productive to inmate rehabilitation. Surely the pas-
sive and reflective nature of writing does not engage these dangers; 
rather, it must contribute to security and rehabilitation. 
Of course, the Son of Sam laws do not in themselves prohibit 
writing; they merely prohibit the reaping of profit. Perhaps it could 
be argued that allowing inmates to accumulate wealth will jeopar-
dize security by engendering jealousy among poorer inmates and 
will eventually lead to incidents of robbery and extortion within the 
prison. This is unpersuasive because regulations exist that require 
funds received by an inmate to be placed in an "inmate trust fund", 
and such funds can only be accessed if the prison administration is 
convinced that "the payment is calculated to assist in the reforma-
tion and rehabilitation of the inmate".80 To accommodate the 
needs of institutional security, the prison administrators are re-
quired to act as custodians of the prisoner's wealth. Even in this 
limited position of control, there is judicial authority for the propo-
sition that the administrators cannot violate the Charter in their 
decisions concerning the disposition of funds accumulated by 
inmates. 81 
78. j\t/altby v. A.G. Sask. (1982), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 153 at 173 (Sask. Q.B.). 
79. See Re Jolivet (1983), 7 C.C.C. (3d) 431 (B.C. S.C.); Badger v. Manitoba 
(A.G.) (1986), 39 Man. R. (2d) 107, 27 C.C.C. (3d} 158 (Man. Q.B.), 
affirmed 29 C.C.C. {3d) 92, 39 Man. R. (2d) 230 (sub nom. Badger v. 
Manitoba) (Man. C.A.); Levesque v. Canada (A.G.) (1985), 25 D.L.R. (4th} 
184 (Fed. T.D.). 
80. Penitentiary Service Regulations, C.R.C. 1970, vol. xiii, c. 1251, s. 32. 
81. Henry v. Commissioner of Penitentiaries, [1987] 3 F.C. 420 (Fed. T.D.). 
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In summary, a literary profit-stripping scheme cannot be justi-
fied on the basis of the status of the criminal author. In another 
context, the Federal Court has sensibly indicated that it is improper 
to thwart the ability of convicted offenders to earn a livelihood;82 
the prisoner is not a slave of the state, nor should he or she be a 
complete dependant of the state. Allowing the prisoner to gain self-
sufficiency through a legitimate vocation is one of the best ways of 
ensuring that this individual will succeed in reintegrating himself 
into society upon release. 
(b) Unjust Enrichment 
The underlying premise of literary profit stripping may be to 
give effect to the common-law principle that no one should profit 
from their wrongdoing. The proposition is easily stated: 
No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage 
of his own wrong ... or to acquire property by his own crime. These 
maxims are dictated by public policy, have their foundation in universal 
law administered in all civilized countries, and have nowhere been super-
seded by statutes.83 
The most common application of this principle has been seen in 
cases disallowing a murderer to claim any benefits flowing to him 
under the victim's will.84 Parliament intends to give statutory re-
cognition to this principle through its proposed amendments to the 
Criminal Code allowing for a stripping of all assets acquired 
through the commission of designated crimes. 85 
Where an inheritance or other benefit accruing from a pre-
exisiting legal obligation between wrongdoer and victim is in-
volved, or where the legislature prevents the retention of fruits of 
crime, there is a direct causal link between the wrongful act and the 
resultant benefit. In the context of a Son of Sam law, the connection 
between the wrong and the benefit is attenuated: interposed be-
tween the wrong and the benefit is the lawful act of the criminal in 
writing or contributing to writing, and, in fact, the benefit reaped is 
82. Litwack v. National Parole Bd. (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (Fed. T.D.). 
83. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 at 511-512 (1889). 
84. See discussion in Fridman and McLeod, Restitution (Toronto: Carswell, 
1982), pp. 561-564; Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution, 3rd ed. (Lon-
don: Sweet and Maxwell, 1986), pp. 624-631. 
85. Note 5, above. 
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more directly connected to the literary efforts of the criminal. Of 
course, there can be little doubt that the expectant profits from 
publishing are in most cases realized solely as a result of the public 
notoriety of the crime, and, in the absence of the intentional 
infliction of injury upon a victim, the criminal would have likely 
had little success in the highly competitive publishing industry. 
The case law dealing with succession to property upon wrong-
ful death draws a distinction between "rights dependent on and 
rights independent of the criminal act". 86 In the context of these 
profit-stripping schemes, this distinction is critical. There is 
nothing problematic in denying an author the full protection of 
copyright where the copyright owner's anticipated gain would flow 
from an illegal act, 87 but re-enacting a crime in literary form is a 
legal activity. Ifwe allow the principle that no one is to profit from 
wrongdoing to apply where there is an attenuated connection be-
tween the wrongful act and the benefit, we end up doing indirectly 
what cannot be done directly. As has already been shown, criminals 
are no longer subject to a general civil disability upon conviction, 
and "it might be suggested that the disabling of a criminal from 
generating profit by subsequent and different conduct conflicts 
with the policies underlying the abolition of attainder and 
forfeiture". 88 
The drawing of causal connections is a hazardous enterprise, 
since a great deal depends upon the subjective perspective of the 
observer. At a minimum, it could be said that the criminal's 
wrongful act is a necessary condition for the realization of subse-
quent profit, in that the publication would not have come into 
existence but for the crime. However, not all necessary conditions 
can be considered in the determination of what constitutes the 
cause of a given phenomenon: it would be the height of absurdity 
86. Goff and Jones, note 84, above, at pp. 628-629. 
87. See, e.g., Aldrich v. One Stop Video Ltd. (1987), 13 B.C.L.R. (2d) 106 (B.C. 
S.C.), in which the court denied a remedy for copyright infringement of 
obscene material; see also, Snepp v. U.S., 100 S. Ct. 763 (1980), in which the 
court ordered that the profits from a publication concerning the author's 
employment with the C.I.A. were to be impressed with a constructive trust, 
because the author published contrary to his contractual obligations with 
the C.I.A.. 
88. McCamus, note 46, above, at p. 169. 
52 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL [4 I.P.J.] 
for a fire marshal to report to the press that a fire was caused by the 
existence of oxygen and the presence of wood. Before the principle 
of unjust enrichment can override the right of the criminal to free 
expression, we must be able to say with some degree of certainty 
that his profit is a direct consequence of his crime. 
Consider the recent Canadian case of the serial killer Clifford 
Olson. In 1981 the R.C.M.P. had reason to believe that Olson was 
responsible for the deaths of 11 missing children. There was a 
paucity of evidence and the police had yet even to recover the 
missing bodies. In order to bring this case to a close and to resolve 
the uncertainty of the parents of the missing children, the R.C.M.P. 
arranged to pay $100,000 to Olson's dependants in exchange for 
information relating to the whereabouts of the children. After the 
conviction of Olson, the parents of the murdered children brought 
an application to recover the $100,000, claiming unjust enrich-
ment. The application was granted and the judge imposed a con-
structive trust upon the money for the benefit of the parents.89 The 
decision was premised upon the principle that no one should be 
able to claim a benefit accruing from their criminal acts. 
On appeal, the B.C. Court of Appeal concluded that this was 
not an appropriate case for applying a constructive trust as a 
remedy for unjust enrichment.90 The Court held that four require-
ments need be present for the invocation of this remedy: (1) an 
enrichment; (2) a corresponding deprivation; (3) an absence of any 
juristic reason for the enrichment; and (4) a causal connection, that 
is, a clear link between the contribution and the disputed assets. 91 
The trial judge believed that it was not necessary to show some 
commensurability between the plaintiffs loss and the criminal's 
gain, but the Court of Appeal disagreed: 
In meeting that requirement, the plaintiffs must show that they were 
deprived when the funds were paid to McNeney .... It is clear on th.e facts 
of this case that the payment by the R.C.M.P. to McNeneywasnot made as 
compensation for the deaths of the children. As I have indicated, it was 
authorized by the Attorney-General primarily to obtain evidence to con-
vict Olson of the murders of the children. The payments to McNeney did 
not deprive the plaintiffs of money which, if it had not been paid to 
89. Rosenfeldt v. Olson, [1985] 2 W.W.R. 502, 20 E.T.R. 133 (B.C. S.C.). 
90. Rosenfeldt v. Olson, (1986] 3 W.W.R. 403 (B.C. C.A.). 
91. Ibid., pp. 407-408. 
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McNeney, would properly have been payable to the plaintiffs. Thus the 
payment to McNeney did not result in any corresponding deprivation to 
the plaintiffs.92 
The same logic applies to the publication of crime re-enact-
ments. It cannot be said that the criminal is being paid as compen-
sation for the crime, nor can it be said that the victims are deprived 
of money to which they are directly entitled. However, despite the 
causation difficulties, there is admittedly something disconcerting 
or even abhorrent about the criminal profiting from his literary 
description ofhis deeds. Even so, assuming that the causal problem 
is dismissed as overly formalistic, one must still contend with the 
balancing problem of whether the principle of unjust enrichment 
outweighs the right to free expression. The following argument 
cannot be lightly dismissed: 
While such profit does not appeal to one's sensibilities as particularly 
praiseworthy, neither is the problem of a sufficient magnitude to qualify as 
one of the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests [which] give 
occasion for permissible limitation when First Amendment rights are 
involved.93 
The principle that no one should profit from their crime is one 
of variable application. It allows the Court to employ its equitable 
jurisdiction to prevent an obvious miscarriage of justice. It is a 
question of balancing equities,94 and, as such, it is difficult to apply 
the principle across the board to all cases in which the criminal 
decides to write about his or her exploits. The injustice attending 
blanket application of the principle has been given legislative recog-
nition in England in a statute that allows for exemption from the 
rule even in cases of wrongful death and inheritance. 9s Abstractly 
92. Ibid. 
93. B. Wand, "Criminals-Turned-Authors: Victims• Rights v. Freedom of 
Speech" (1979), 54 Indiana L.J. 443, 459. 
94. See Hardy v. Motor Insurers' Bureau, [1964] 2 All E.R. 742 (H.L.). At 
750-751, Lord Diplock elaborates upon the maxim ex turpi causa non 
oritur actio by commenting: 
[T]he court's refusal to assert a right, even against the person who has 
committed the anti-social act, will depend not only on the nature of 
the anti-social act but also on the right asserted. The court has to 
weigh the gravity of the anti-social act and the extent to which it will 
be encouraged by enforcing the right sought to be asserted against the 
social harm which will be caused ifthe right is not enforced. 
95. Goff and Jones, note 84, above, at pp. 626-627. 
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stated, the maxim accords with one's intuitive sense of justice, but 
its application cannot be divorced from the particular facts of any 
given case. A Son of Sam law is an overinclusive response that is not 
narrowly tailored to the problem of unjust enrichment. The law 
would apply equally to a book that graphically details every mo-
ment of the crime in every chapter, as well as a book in which there 
is only a fleeting reference to the crime. The law further applies 
equally to a book that glorifies the crime and one in which the 
criminal author soundly condemns his prior condu~t. This over-
inclusive coverage is far from the necessary balancing of equities 
that is required for invocation of the principle. 
In a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, it was 
held that the principle that no one should profit from wrongdoing 
could not operate in disregard of the principle of the presumption 
of innocence.96 If this concern for preventing unjust enrichment 
does not have sufficient weight to oust the presumption of inno-
:ence, then, quite apart from the problems of causation and over-
nclusion, how can it be said that it is weighty enough to override 
he right to free expression? The balancing of principles and the 
veighing of competing interests do not admit of mathematical 
>recision, but, in this case, all considerations point in favour of 
1pholding the constitutional right. 
c) Victims' Rights 
On November 6, 1987, the Minister of Justice, Ray 
-Inatyshyn, explained at a press conference that the government 
vas determined to increase the legislative protections of victims 
'because the victim of crime is often a forgotten person in our 
:riminal justice system".97 Much ink has been spilt in the past 
lecade over the plight ofthis forgotten participant in the criminal 
Justice system98 resulting in numerous recent reforms. How the 
96. R. v. Fleming, [1986] l S.C.R. 415, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 297. 
97. R. Cleroux, "Sweeping Reforms Proposed in Payments to Crime Victims," 
6 Nov. 1987, The Toronto Globe and Mail, p. 2. 
98. For sampling of the literature, see Elias, note l above; Fattah, note 2 above; 
Victims' Right's Symposium" (1983-84), 11 Peppermne L. Rev. l-182.; J. 
Hagan, Victims Before the Law: The Organizational Domination of Crimi-
nal Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983); E. Ziegenhagen, Victims, Crime 
and Social Control (New York: Praeger, 1977); B. Gala way & J. Hudson, 
eds., Perspectives on Crime Victims (St. Louis: C.V. Mosby Co., 1981). 
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victim happened to become an invisible participant is not entirely 
clear, but it is true that the machinery of justice added insult to 
injury by excluding the victim from the process. 
Historically, all crimes were indistinguishable from torts. The 
emergence of a conception of crime as a state concern did not 
initially impair the ability of the victim to seek compensation in the 
criminal proceedings. In fact, the fundamental premise of prosecu-
tion of crime in England was that it was to be initiated and brought 
to completion by the complainant, and the notion of public pros-
ecution by state officials that began officially in the late nineteenth 
century was viewed as an exception to the rule of private prosecu-
tion. 99 Eventually prosecution by state officials became the norm, 
but the lingering belief that the system was premised upon private 
prosecution blinded the state to the fact that, slowly but surely, the 
victim was being squeezed out of all consideration. This develop-
ment should be contrasted with the situation on the Continent, 
where it was readily accepted that prosecution by the state was the 
proper response to crime. The open acceptance of the exclusion of 
the victim from the prosecutorial process forced the state to de-
velop other mechanisms for victim satisfaction. In France, for 
example, there developed the practice of the action civile, in which 
the victim was allowed to join his civil claim to any ongoing state 
prosecution. 100 
The enactment of Son of Sam laws is another response to the 
plight of victims. These laws are designed to supplement existing 
compensation schemes by ensuring that the criminal's windfall 
publishing profits are not dissipated and are thus made readily 
available to satisfy the civil judgments of victims. If the state 
purports to justify the infringement of free expression rights on the 
basis of the compelling and pressing interest in assisting victims, it is 
importantto note thatthisjustification will only apply to a "type 1" 
mode of distribution, in which the victims have exclusive rights to 
the funds existing in the escrow account, with any remaining funds 
99. For a brief description of the evolution of the role of the public prosecutor, 
see Law Reform Commission of Canada, Private Prosecutions (1986), pp. 
33-37. 
100. P. Campbell, "A Comparative Study of Victim Compensation Procedures 
in France and The United States" (1979-80), 3 Hastings Int'l and Com-
parative L Rev. 321 at 323-332. 
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being returned to the offender. Any other mode of distribution that 
allows other creditors, or the state itself, to share in the distribution 
of proceeds cannot be justified on the basis of the pressing state 
concern with victim assistance. 
Atthe outset, one must question the need for a profit-stripping 
scheme in the light of existing compensatory schemes. At the 
present time in Canada, it is possible for victims to apply at the time 
of sentencing under section 65 3 of the Criminal Code for compen-
sation for loss or damage to property. In addition, under section 
446.2 of the Code, the Court may order the restitution of property 
obtained by the commission of the offence if such property is 
"before the Court"; for example, if it has been lawfully seized 
during investigation. These provisions are significantly limited, 
since awards are limited to property loss and the Court is precluded 
from awarding compensation for "pain and suffering" or "injured 
feelings" .101 In addition, the criminal court will not entertain appli-
cations for compensation if the claim is disputed or unduly 
complex.102 
Realizing the limited applicability of these supplementary 
sentencing provisions, most provincial jurisdictions have enacted 
victim compensation schemes that allow victims to apply for com-
pensation, whether or not the off ender has been apprehended and 
successfully prosecuted. The scheme in Ontario allows for compen-
sation for injury or loss up to an amount of $25,000. 103 Not only is 
it extremely rare for a victim to receive the maximum award, but 
any award is to be decreased in light of any other benefit or 
compensation received,104 and in light of the Board's assessment of 
the victim's behaviour "that may have directly or indirectly con-
tributed to his death or injury". 105 Despite the best intentions of the 
governments, most compensatory schemes have been condemned 
as inefficient and limited vehicles for compensation. 106 Some com-
10 l. R. v. Groves (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 65, 39 C.R.N.S. 366 (Ont. H.C.); R. v. 
Farley, (1976] W.W.D. 128 (Man. CA). 
102. R. v. Zelensky, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940 at 963-964, 41 C.C.C. (2d) 97 at 113; R. 
v. O'Reilly, Ont. C.A., June 21, 1984. 
103. Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 82, as am. S.O. 
1986, c. 37. 
104. Ibid., s. 17(3). 
105. Ibid., s. 17(1). 
106. Note 2, above. 
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mentators have gone so far as to suggest that these compensation 
schemes are mere political palliatives that mask the state's lack of 
concern for victims.101 
It is unfair to cast aspersions upon state efforts to assist victims 
in this way, since compensation schemes are merely a small part of 
official responses to a victim's needs. In addition to compensation 
schemes, there are victim-witness programs, social service referral 
programs, crisis intervention programs, victim advocacy programs 
and victim-offender mediation programs. 108 Recently Manitoba 
passed legislation creating a victim's Bill ofRights109 to ensure that 
victims are notified of developments in the prosecution and are 
afforded limited rights of participation in the process. At a mini-
mum, it can be said that the state is sincere in its efforts to assist, 
but, as might be expected, it is unwilling to invest needed funds to 
transform its sincere wishes into effective programs. If funding is 
the major obstacle to effective assistance, then there is all the more 
reason for the state to tap into the windfall publishing profits of 
criminals. 
The importance of the state objective of compensating victims 
cannot be gainsaid. As the Law Reform Commission of Canada 
has commented: 
Recognition of the victim's needs underlies at the same time the larger 
social interest inherent in the individual victim's loss. Thus, social values 
are reaffirmed through restitution to victims. Society gains from restitu-
tion in other ways as well. To the extent that restitution works towards self-
correction, and prevents or at least discourages the offender's commitment 
to a life of crime, the community enjoys a measure of protection, secu~ty 
and savings. Depriving offenders of the fruits of their crimes or ensunng 
that offenders assist in compensating victims for their losses should assist 
in discouraging criminal activity. Ho 
The compelling interest in compensating victims has been noted in 
most jurisdictions, to the extent that in 1983 the Council of Europe 
enacted the European Convention on the Compensation of Vic-
tims of Violent Crime to ensure that all signatory nations estab-
107. Elias, note 2, above. 
I 08. Elias, note 2, above, at pp. 297-299; Federal/Provincial Task Force, note 4, 
above, at pp. 7 5-8 l. 
109. Justice for Victims Act, S.M. 1986, c. J40, C.C.S.M. J40. 
110. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Restitution and Compensation 
(1974), pp. 7-8. 
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lished minimum requirements to meet theneedsofvictims.111 The 
government of Canada has recently escalated its efforts to assist 
victims by announcing its intention to inject some 16 million 
dollars into provincial compensation schemes, and to enact legisla-
tion that requires offenders, upon sentencing, to pay a fine sur-
charge that will be deposited in a provincial fund set up for victim 
compensation. 112 The compelling state objective may be praised by 
all, but is it of sufficient weight to allow for the violation of freedom 
of expression? 
It might be argued that this praiseworthy objective cannot 
thwart the guarantee of constitutional rights because the rights of 
victims are not constitutionally enshrinedm and surely a well-
entrenched constitutional right outweighs a mere entitlement to 
compensation. This is a specious argument because the balancing 
that must be undertaken under section 1 of the Charter does not 
presuppose a weighing of commensurate constitutional rights. 
There may be cases in which a section 1 analysis will require a 
balancing of constitutional rights (for example, freedom of the 
press under section 2 versus the right to a fair trial under section 
l l(d)), but, in most cases, what is contemplated by the section 1 
limitation upon rights is the balancing of rights as offset by well-
recognized and approved state objectives. In examining the consti-
tutionality of random police inspections of cars at spot checks (for 
example, the R.I.D.E. (Reduce Impaired Driving Everywhere) pro-
gram), the courts posit as the pressing state objective the mainte-
nance of highway safety, and this objective is accepted despite the 
absence of any well-entrenched right of owners and drivers of 
automobiles. 114 
A derivation of the argument that victims' rights are more 
properly characterized as mere entitlements is the argument that 
111. See Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the European Convention on 
the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crime (Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe, Publishing Section, 1984). 
112. Note 4, above. 
113. Two cases have drawn significant conclusions from the exclusion of the 
victi.m from the terms of the Charter: see Chartrand v. Quebec (Min. of 
Justice) (1986), 55 C.R. (3d) 97 (Que. S.C.); Hamilton v. R. (1986), 30 
C.C.C. (3d) 65 (B.C. S.C.). 
114. See R. v. Ladouceur (1987), 59 O.R. (2d) 688, 57 C.R. (3d) 45 (Ont. C.A.); 
Iron v. R. (1987), 55 C.R. (3d) 289 (Sask. C.A.). 
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compensatory awards to victims are made ex gratia and that there 
is no obligation on the state to provide such awards. Accordingly, it 
would be anomalous to impair constitutional rights solely to render 
effective an imperfect obligation. Once again, this argument misses 
the mark because most state objectives, such as maintaining high-
way safety, are not obligatory undertakings. In any event, a cogent 
counter-argument can be made that victim assistance is a state 
obligation because the state has a duty to protect its citizens from 
criminal injury: 
One of the primary and most important duties of government is to provide 
for the physical safety of those under its jurisdiction, and, failing that, for 
the successful prosecution of those who infringe on that safety. Similarly, 
one of the mostimportantrightsofall inhabitantsofagiven political entity 
is to receive protection .... While the government cannot do the impossi-
ble and should not be considered to be an insurer, it should be held 
responsible in attempting to fulfill its duties of protection and 
prosecution.115 
The proper resolution of the balancing of the right to free 
expression and the right to compensation for crime is problematic, 
and, no doubt, reasonable people will strike the balance differently. 
In my view, we need not resolve this issue because the Son of Sam 
laws do not satisfy the other requirements of section 1 of the Charter 
as a result of disproportionality and the availability ofless restric-
tive means to achieve the state objective. First, one must question 
why it is that publishing profits have been singled out as the only 
source offunds to be made available to victims. Publishing profits 
may be a likely source of revenue, but there is no reason why the 
legislation should not demand that all persons who contract with an 
incarcerated offender be required to deposit the funds in the escrow 
account for the benefit of victims. 
Second, one must recognize that the entire legislation is pre-
mised upon a successful civil suit by the victim. Son of Sam laws do 
not purport to create a new cause of action, nor do they allow 
victims access to funds without first showing their entitlement 
through a successful suit. In effect, the legislation is merely provid-
ing a mechanism for enforcing judgments out of a fund generated 
115. R. Aynes, "Constitutional Considerations: Government Responsibility 
and the Right Not to be a Victim" (1983-84), 11 Pepperdine L. Rev. 63 at 
115-116. 
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by the exercise of free speech rights. One must therefore inquire 
into whether existing enforcement mechanisms are deficient in 
protecting the rights of victims. The mechanisms in place under the 
Rules of Practice may have noticeable deficiencies, 11 6 but the 
provisions for seizure and sale and garnishment of wagesm are at 
least adequate against a debtor who is not indigent. Of course, the 
motivation for creating Son of Sam laws has been the realization 
that most offenders are indigent; yet there are offenders who may 
happen upon windfall profits later in life. 
The ordinary civil process for executing judgments against 
debtors who are penniless, but who have future potential for profit, 
is seriously flawed. Creditors may be able to make use of Jtfareva 
injunctions, 118 and there is case law suggesting that the Attorney 
General mayo btain an injunction on behalf of a victim restraining 
the offender from dissipating current assets.119 However, once 
again, these mechanisms are only effective against existing funds, 
and for potential sources of wealth in the future the creditor must 
rely upon periodic examination of the debtor120 to determine if 
there are any changes in his wealth that may be subject to execu-
tion. The procedure is completely "hit and miss" and is an ineffec-
tive method for securing victim compensation. 
The current problems in enforcing judgments may justify a 
special procedure for a special class of creditor, the victim of crime. 
However, it is possible to achieve the objective of effective victim 
compensation without triggering the constitutional problems in-
herent in Son of Sam legislation. This can be done by adopting the 
notification requirements already present in the impugned legisla-
116. For a discussion of some of the problems relating to enforcement of debts, 
see Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Enforcement of 
Judgement Debts & Related Matters (1981). 
117. Rules of Civil Procedure, 0. Reg. 560/84, s. 60.07 (seizure and sale), s. 
60.08 (garnishment). 
118. For cases detailing the preconditions for the use of this special interlocutory 
injunction, see Chitel v. Rothbart (1982), 39 O.R. (2d) 513 (Ont. C.A.); 
Aetna Financial Services Ltd. v. Feigelman, [1985] 2 W.W.R. 97 (S.C.C.); 
see also, D. McAllister, Mareva Injunctions, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 
1987). 
l 19. A.G. Ontario v. Stranges (1984), 46 O.R. (2d)452, 12 C.C.C. (3d)455 (Ont. 
H.C.); affirmed 47 0.R. (2d) 348, 13 C.C.C. (3d) 575. 
120. Note 117, above, s. 60.18. The Rules of Practice allow for one examination 
of the debtor per year (or more with leave of the court). 
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tion, so that anyone contracting with an incarcerated offender must 
notify the court or an administrative board of the contract, and, in 
tum, the victim will be notified of the potential source of funds. If 
the legislature believes that there is still the danger of funds being 
dissipated, notwithstanding the notification, then the ordinary 
methods of execution can be supplemented by requiring the con-
tracting party to deposit all funds in an escrow account. The escrow 
account still poses a constitutional problem ·with respect to publish-
ing profits. However, the section 1 Charter argument, based upon 
the compelling objective of assisting victims, should be sustained if 
the funds in the escrow account are derived from all types of 
contracts, to forestall the contention that the establishment of an 
escrow fund has a disproportionate impact upon individuals exer-
cising their rights of free expression. 
5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Many people may dismiss Son of Sam laws as simply a neces-
sary evil in a country such as the United States, where crass com-
mercialism is rampant, and where any person with initiative can 
profit from the most despicable endeavours. Such naivete cannot 
be taken seriously. The rise of the criminal as successful literary 
figure may have been accelerated in the United States due to the 
presence of the life story fee contract; but the serial killer as literary 
hero is not a product of any particular time or place. The great 
success of Roger Caron's book, Go Boy, and of works detailing the 
exploits of Peter Demeter or Helmut Buxbaum, 121 indicates that 
there is a substantial market for criminal authors. It can be noted in 
passing that members of society are not innocent and passive 
observers of the injustice of criminals profiting from publication. 
Society is an active accomplice to this injustice, which would not 
occur if we restrained our appetite for consuming stories that 
sordidly describe crimes and other cruelties. 
This paper has, it is hoped, shown that any attempts by law-
makers to redistribute publishing profits for the benefit of victims is 
121. G. Jonas, By Persons Unknown: The Strange Death of Christine Demeter 
(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1977). Immediately after the conviction 
of Helmut Buxbaum for the murder ofhis wife, three books appeared in the 
market: Chip Martin, Buxbaum: A Murderous Affair (1986); T. Bissland, 
Buxbaum (1986); H. Bird, Conspiracy to Murder (1986). 
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subject to constitutional infirmity in Canada. Such schemes cannot 
be justified on the basis that prisoners are not competent to be 
rights-bearers, because it is quite clear that the protection of the 
Charter does not end at the prison gate. Similarly, no justification 
can be found in the laudable objectives of compensating victims or 
denying offenders the profits of crime. Both these justifications fall 
short of being reasonable limits prescribed by law, because they 
both suffer from the flaw of having a disproportionate impact on 
the right of free speech. Perhaps it may be argued that, standing 
alone, each justification is flawed, but that the synergistic combina-
tion of both should cure whatever flaw is inherent in either standing 
alone. It may be argued that publication profits that cannot be 
considered an unjust enrichment, because of a remote causal con-
nection between wrongdoing and profit, may still be stripped on the 
basis that the state has a pressing obligation to make the victim 
whole, and that any profits that cannot be properly channelled to 
victims may still be forfeited by falling back upon an unjust enrich-
ment claim. This argument raises the novel and suspect constitu-
tional proposition that two flawed justifications for infringement 
become magically transformed into one coherent and flawless 
justification. 
Before victims of crime jump on the bandwagon calling for 
restrictions on the ability of the criminal to profit from publications 
of re-enactments, they should remember that: 
The scrupulous and the just, the noble, humane and devoted natures, the 
unselfish and the intelligent, may begin a movement - but it passes away 
from them. They are not leaders of a revolution. They are its victims. 122 
The advancement of Son of Sam laws as a vehicle for furthering 
victims' rights has the potential for making the compensated victim 
a victim of another kind. By deterring the dissemination of valuable 
insights into the behaviour of dangerous individuals, all victims are 
denied the opportunity of having information made available that 
will help them understand what led to their victimization in the first 
place. 
122. The words of Joseph Conrad as quoted in W.H. Auden and L. Kronen-
berger, Aphorisms: A Personal Selection (Harrisonburg: Penguin, 1985) p. 
310. 
